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Minimum Wages and the Gender Gap in Pay: 
New Evidence from the UK and Ireland
Women are disproportionately in low paid work compared to men so, in the absence of 
rationing effects on their employment, they should benefit the most from minimum wage 
policies. This study examines the change in the gender wage gap around the introduction 
of minimum wages in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Using survey data for the two 
countries, we develop a decomposition of the change in the gender differences in wage 
distributions around the date of introduction of minimum wages. We separate out 
‘price’ effects attributed to minimum wages from ‘employment composition’ effects. A 
significant reduction of the gender gap at low wages is observed after the introduction of 
the minimum wage in Ireland while there is hardly any change in the UK. Counterfactual 
simulations show that the difference between countries may be attributed to gender 
differences in non-compliance with the minimum wage legislation in the UK.
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1 Introduction
Recent research into the gender wage gap has increasingly focused on more global meth-
ods than the evaluation of gender wage di¤erences at the mean. Gender gaps are often
concentrated either at the bottom of the distribution (sticky oors) or at the top (glass
ceilings). This literature has beneted from the surge of methods extending Oaxaca-
Blinder type decompositions to the whole wage distribution (see the surveys in Melly,
2006, Fortin, et al., 2011, Chernozhukov et al., 2013). Most directly relevant for policy
makers, distributional analyses provide some insights into the intended or unintended ef-
fects of labour market policies on wage inequality and, in particular, gender wage gaps.
This is particularly the case of policies like the national minimum wage (henceforth NMW)
which, by design, a¤ect workers at di¤erent positions of the wage distribution di¤erently.
NMW policies tend to compress the bottom of the wage distribution, where women are
disproportionately represented. As a result, women should benet the most from NMWs,
at least in the absence of changes to their employment status. A (possibly unintended)
consequence of the NMW is therefore a reduction of the gender wage gap.
Testing this prediction is usually complicated. At the macro level, it is di¢ cult to control
for all sources of cross-country di¤erences beyond wage distributions and NMWpolicies. A
successful attempt to do so is Blau and Kahn (2003), who check for a negative correlation
between the gender gap and the biteof NMWs (the NMW level as a proportion of the
average wage). For Ireland, McGuinness et al. (2008) use the proportion of NMWworkers
in a rm to identify the wage disadvantage to men and women who are employed in low-
paying rms. With micro data, time variations in NMWs are often too small to provide
detectable e¤ects. Studies close to ours have used changes in NMW legislation in the US
(Blau and Kahn, 1997), in Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2005, 2009) and in Indonesia
(Hallward-Driemeier et al, 2017) to check how gender gaps vary with NMW levels. In this
study, we examine an even more radical policy event, namely the introduction of NMW
legislation.
We focus on the introduction of a NMW in the UK in 1999 and in Ireland in 2000. Using
the Living in Ireland survey (LII) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we
employ a exible model of wage distributions to construct counterfactual distributions
of wages based on a xed distribution of covariates for women in each country. We
estimate gender di¤erences in wage distributions before and after the introduction of
the NMW separating out workers characteristics (explained/composition) e¤ects from
residual (unexplained/discriminatory) di¤erentials. We can thus show how the gender
wage gap at the bottom of the distribution evolved after the introduction of the NMW in
each country, as well as measure possible spillovere¤ects further up in the distribution.
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It is noteworthy that we focus on two neighbouring countries sharing a common past
history, with highly centralized systems of collective wage bargaining and a similar high
level of sticky oorbefore the policy reform. Beyond these common initial conditions,
the almost simultaneous introduction of a NMW in Ireland and the UK allows us to assess
how much the impact may di¤er according to the level at which minimum wages are set
(the biteof the NMW) and to the degree of compliance.
Our results are as follows: A large reduction in the gender wage gap at the bottom of
the distribution is found after the introduction of the NMW in Ireland while there is
hardly any change in the UK. We perform several robustness checks that include holding
employment composition constant using panel data, detrending the e¤ects (a triple di¤er-
ence approach), checking the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of occupation and
industry variables, changing the reference group and accounting for selection into work.
Our conclusions are stable. To explain contrasted results between Ireland and the UK, we
suggest an extrapolation exercise that examines the counterfactual e¤ect of introducing
the same NMW compliance in the UK as in Ireland. We nd that the absence of an e¤ect
in the UK may be due to the degree of non-compliance with NMW legislation.
2 Literature and Institutional Background
2.1 Gender Wage Gaps and Labour Market Policies
Gender gaps have been studied in the context of di¤erent career development patterns
between men and women.1 To explain sticky oors in particular, the literature has focused
on factors that may a¤ect wage inequality at the start of the career, including signaling
and statistical discrimination (Belley et al. 2015). Closer to our focus, the role of labour
market regulation a¤ecting low-skilled workers is also emphasized. Countries with higher
unionization rates tend to have lower wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn, 1996), possibly
lowering the wage gap. Trade unions may be less likely to represent the interests of their
female electorate because they may be perceived as having less attachment to the labour
market (Booth and Francesconi, 2003). They may also be less sensitive to the interests
of members at the low end of the wage distribution (Arulampalam et al., 2007).
More specically, studies of the impact of NMW on the wage distribution usually nd that
such regulation compresses the bottom of the distribution, reducing the sticky oor e¤ect.
1The role of child-related career interruption (Meurs et al., 2010), and specic discrimination that
prevents women from achieving high wages and top positions are particularly important in explaining
glass ceilings. Studying these entails accounting for rm-specic heterogeneity and the use of matched
worker-rm data (Meng and Meurs, 2004; Nordman and Wol¤, 2011).
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Using variation in the number of NMW workers across rms in Ireland, McGuinness et
al (2008) nd that the part-time gender wage gap is decreased by the NMW. Ganguli
and Terrell (2005, 2009) nd that the doubling of the NMW between 1997 and 2003
contributed to the closing of the gender wage gap in Ukraine. Blau and Kahn (1997) also
emphasize that the sharp decline in the NMW between 1979 and 1988 in the US is one of
the important institutional factors explaining the widening gender gap during this period.
Robinson (2002), using quantile regression methods, nds no evidence that the NMW in
the UK a¤ected the gender wage gap in the lower part of the wage distribution. Another
study by Robinson (2005) nds some evidence of a narrowing of the gender pay gap by
1   2 percentage points in regions where women comprise a relatively large share of the
low paid, and where the regional bite is larger (like Scotland). Our study expands on this
type of study by using a more appropriate distributional analysis, as described below, and
by providing a comparative setting across two neighbouring countries with di¤erent wage
distributions and NMW bites.
2.2 Distributional Analyses
Departing from the standard decomposition method of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973),
a number of decomposition methods for wage distributions have been proposed (such as
Juhn et al., 1993, DiNardo et al., 1996, Gosling et al., 2000, Melly, 2006, Machado and
Mata, 2005, among others). These methods have been applied in analyses of the gender
gap in many di¤erent contexts and regions. Coverage includes Europe (Arulampalam et
al., 2007, Beblo et al. 2003), Sweden (Albrecht et al., 2003), the UK (Blundell et al.,
2007, Chzhen and Mumford, 2011), Spain (Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005, de la Rica et
al., 2008), Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell, 2005) and the US (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2008,
Weinberger and Kuhn, 2010). Such an approach is suitable here since NMW policies are
targeted at low wages, so that looking at the evolution of mean wage di¤erences between
men and women before and after the introduction of the NMW may not capture the
impact of the policy well.
Various alternative methods have been put forward for such distributional analyses (see
the survey of Fortin et al., 2011). The most popular quantile-regression-based methods à
la Machado and Mata (2005) are less than ideal in our context because the discontinuity
in wages around the minimum wage is not easily captured by quantile regressions. On
the contrary, the distribution regression(DR) approach proposed in Foresi and Peracchi
(1995), and recently extended by Chernozhukov et al. (2013), is particularly well-suited.
By modeling the distribution function directly (rather than its inverse, the quantile func-
tion), this approach is not a¤ected by the bunching of data around the minimum wage.
Given our focus on the bottom of the wage distribution, this aspect is rather critical. Al-
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though the two approaches are theoretically equivalent (Koenker et al., 2013), empirical
evidence suggests that DR generally provides better t to wage distribution data than
quantile regression (Rothe and Wied, 2013, Van Kerm et al., 2016).
2.3 Gender Gaps and Labour Policies in Ireland and the UK
Gender Wage Gaps. Ireland is a country with a history of gender inequality on the
labour market due to a combination of cultural and religious ideals, a traditionally unequal
gender division of labour and a relatively weak economy until the Celtic Tiger years in
the 1990s. Despite the rapid catching up of female labour market participation during
this period and extensive equality legislation (Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 and
the Employment Equality Act 1998), the Irish gender wage gap has remained substantial.
In the UK, attention was given relatively early to the issue of equal pay as, during the two
World Wars, women took up typically male jobs. The Equal Pay Act of 1970 legislated
for equal pay and conditions for men and women. However, the modication of job titles
often allowed employers to continue discriminatory practices and, over four decades later,
there still exists an unexplained gender wage gap.
Using harmonized micro data for Europe, panel A in Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the raw gender wage gap in the UK, Ireland and in the EU-27 during the period studied.
Between 1997 and 2001, the gap was similar and relatively stable in both countries, with
men earning, on average, 20 24% more than women. This was, however, higher than the
EU average of 16%. At the beginning of this century, the Irish gender wage gap decreased
relative to the UK one.
Panel B in Figure 1 shows that this gap was not uniform across the wage distribution.
Until the NMW was introduced, the raw gender wage gap in Ireland was larger at the
bottom and in the middle of the wage distribution than at the top. After the introduction
of the NMW, the raw gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution fell sharply.
The raw gender wage gap in the UK was more similar across the wage distribution with no
sharp changes visible around the introduction of the NMW. Results from Arulampalam
et al. (2007) corroborate this observation: they report a raw gender wage gap in the rst
decile of earnings of 25% in Ireland and 24% in the UK, while the gender gap in the
top decile of earnings was more contrasted (13% and 25% respectively). While these are
raw gaps, the adjusted wage gaps (i.e. corrected for gender di¤erences in skills and other
characteristics) exhibit similar patterns in Arulampalam et al. (2007). Both countries
display high gender inequality in the lower part of the distribution (while Ireland may
have less of a glass ceilingprior to the introduction of the NMW than the UK). Similar
intensities of sticky oorsin the two neighbouring countries provide an interesting com-
mon set-up. Panel B of Figure 1 also shows that trends in the gender wage gaps across
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the wage distribution were relatively similar and generally declining in the run up to the
introduction of the NMW in both countries.
Figure 1 around here
National Minimum Wages. NMWs were introduced almost simultaneously in the
UK and Ireland. The British industry-based Wages Council system that regulated pay in
many sectors was abolished in 1993 amid arguments that it reduced employment, although
there was little evidence that the system had cost jobs (Machin and Manning, 1994). In
April 1999, a NMW of $3.60 per hour for those aged 22 or older was introduced, as well
as a youth rate of $3 per hour for those aged 18 to 21. One of the stated aims of this
legislation was actually to tackle the gender pay gap. Another one was to precede the
increased generosity of the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC), in order to reduce the
possibility of rms being able to appropriate some of the benets of the subsidy to reduce
their gross wage bill. About 6% of workerswages were raised up to the minimum (Dickens
and Manning, 2003) and prominent among these were part-time female workers (Metcalf,
1999). In 1999 in Ireland, the newly created Minimum Wage Commission recommended
an initial rate of IE$4.40 per hour (equivalent to $3:40 as shown in Table 1), representing
two thirds of median earnings (ONeill et al, 2006). Prior to this, industry specic NMWs
in Ireland were set by Joint Labour Committees. However the wages specied in these
agreements were often low and badly enforced and covered less than a quarter of the
workforce. O¢ cial gures suggest that the NMW directly beneted approximately 13:5%
of the total workforce, comprising 17% of female workers and 11% of male workers. There
is little evidence in the literature relating to the e¤ectiveness of the Irish NMW in tackling
the gender wage gap (an exception is McGuinness et al. (2008) who nd that the Irish
NMW wage improved the relative position of part-time women only).
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
We use two panel datasets, the Living in Ireland Survey (LII) and the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS). The fact that the same set of households is interviewed each year
means that it is possible to study changes in the characteristics and circumstances of
particular individuals over time. We restrict our main sample to people observed in 1999
and 2001 in Ireland and 1998 and 2000 in the UK. The original sample size for the two
years of interest is 12; 604 in Ireland and 20; 274 in the UK. We further restrict our sample
to those aged 22  64 (those under 22 year olds are not eligible for the NMW in the UK)
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and drop those still in education. Of these, we observe 4; 563 workers in Ireland and 7; 732
workers in the UK over the two years in question. This constitutes our baseline sample
(Sample 1). Appendix Table A.1 shows how these observations are split between men and
women and the pre- and post-NMW periods.
Hourly wages are constructed from the current gross weekly wage and usual hours per
week in LII and gross monthly pay (including overtime), standard weekly hours and paid
overtime hours per week in BHPS. We normalise hourly wages to their level during the
year of the introduction of the NMW (2000 in Ireland, 1999 in the UK), using Consumer
Price Indices. The main changes observed in the sample composition between the pre-
and post-NMW periods are an increased hourly wage and an increase in the average age
of the population.
Alternative sample selections are described in Appendix Table A.2. These will be used in
robustness checks in Section 4.3. An issue specic to the Irish data is the refreshment
sample of 1; 515 households that was added to the survey in 2000 to redress attrition over
the life of the survey. To tackle this issue, we shall present alternative results without
this refreshment sample for Ireland (Sample 1a). A nal selection used in our sensitivity
analysis (Sample 2) consists of all those who are observed both before and after the
introduction of the NMW and who work at least part-time ( 15 hours per week) in both
periods.
3.2 Preliminary Statistics and Checks
Biteof the National Minimum Wages. We provide preliminary statistics about
NMWs and labour markets in Ireland and the UK. Table 1 rst shows the NMW level
and bitein each country. The bite of the NMW is around 10% higher in Ireland than
in the UK when expressed in terms of median wage and 15% higher as a fraction of the
mean. Table 2 shows the employment rate and proportion of workers earning less that
the NMW in each country and for the year before (t 1) and after (t+1) its introduction.
Employment rates for men are similar in the two countries (80   85% over the time
period examined) although employment rates for women are much lower (though rising)
in Ireland than in the UK. There were more people earning less than the NMW in Ireland
(12%) than in the UK (9%) in t  1 and, in both countries, the vast majority of these are
women. This is in line with o¢ cial statistics, giving us condence in the chosen datasets.
However, although there was a large drop in the number of women earning less than the
NMW in t + 1 in Ireland, the corresponding proportional drop was much lower in the
UK. Beyond measurement errors, which are likely to be similar in the two datasets used,
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possible explanations include informal labour markets and ine¤ective NMW enforcement.2
The latter explanation seems most likely to support the diverging e¤ects of the NMW in
the two countries, as we demonstrate in Section 4.4.
Table 1 around here
Table 2 around here
Potential Employment E¤ects. While we focus on the change in the gender wage
gap after the introduction of a NMW, the NMW may also a¤ect the employment of low
skilled workers, and possibly does so di¤erently for men and women. The literature on this
topic is mixed (see Neumark and Wascher, 2007 for a comprehensive overview). Stewart
(2004), Metcalf (2008) and Dolton et al (2012) report evidence of little or no employment
e¤ect of the introduction of the British NMW. ONeill et al (2006) nd that the NMW
may have had a negative e¤ect on employment for rms with a high proportion of low
wage workers but the size of these e¤ects is modest. Table 3 shows the rate of entry to
and exit from the labour market of men and women whose earnings are in the vicinity of
the NMW in the year before its introduction or in the year after its introduction. In both
countries, entry and exit rates are larger for those earning less than the NMW than for
those earning over the NMW, an indication of the high turnover rate for low-skilled jobs.
In Ireland, male exit rates are higher in 2001 than in 1999. This is true for all categories
of wages but the di¤erence is small and only statistically signicant for those earning
more than the NMW. Female exit rates in Ireland are not signicantly di¤erent before
or after the introduction of the NMW. Both male and female entry rates in Ireland are
actually higher in 2001 than in 1999 for those earning up to the NMW and this di¤erence
is statistically signicant. Entry rates for higher earners change less over the two year
period with a decrease noticeable for men earning between 1.25 and 1.5 times the NMW
and a decrease of a similar magnitude noted for women earning over 1.5 times the NMW.
In the UK, the exit rates of males earning less than the NMW are not statistically
di¤erent from each other in 2000 and in 1998. At higher wage levels, the exit rate of males
is lower in 2000 than in 1998. There is little change in female exit rates over this period.
Looking at entry rates, there is a decrease in the entry rate of females to jobs paying up to
2The presence of apprentices (who are paid below the NMW) may also contribute as these are not
identied in the data. However, apprenticeships made up a tiny proportion of employment contracts in
both the UK and Ireland - 0.3% of male contracts and 0.4% of female contracts in the UK and 1.1% of
male contracts and 0.5% of female contracts in Ireland (Eurostat, 2002). Additionally, most apprentices
are younger than the age cut-o¤ of 22 which we impose in our empirical specication so this is unlikely
to be an issue.
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the NMW. Other than that, there is no change to entry rates of men or women between
the two periods.
These statistics show that women do not appear to be disproportionately a¤ected by
possible employment e¤ects. We do not, therefore, expect that gender di¤erentials in the
employment e¤ects of the NMW will drive our ndings relating to the e¤ect of the NMW
on the gender wage gap. Note that existing evidence points to little or no employment
e¤ect of the introduction of the NMW in the UK (Metcalf, 2008; Dolton et al, 2012) and
Ireland (ONeill et al. 2006). However, in order to ensure that this is not the case, we
shall account for potential employment composition e¤ects in our decomposition, perform
robustness checks which limit the sample of interest to all those employed before and after
the introduction of the NMW, and control for selection into employment.
Table 3 around here
Other Institutions and Policies. Union density was stable, at around 30%, in the
UK during the period in question although it decreased from 41.5% to 36.6% in Ireland
between 1998 and 2001 (Blanchower, 2006). The period 19972001 was one of generous
budgets in both countries, notably with increased levels of transfers to working poor
families (the Family Income Supplement increased in 1998 and 2000 in Ireland while the
WFTC was introduced to replace the Family Credit in October 1999 in the UK). In
Ireland, the Lone Parent Allowance and Child Benet were also increased while income
tax rates were decreased in both the higher and lower brackets, as well as an increased tax
free allowance for all household types. In the UK, New Dealsmeasures were introduced
in 1998 to help vulnerable groups, notably lone parents and young people, to nd jobs
or to increase their hours of work. These policies should not a¤ect our results directly
however since they a¤ect net income, not gross wages as used in our estimations.3 Another
channel to consider is the indirect e¤ect of policy changes on labour supply. For example,
the WFTC reform may have incited adults in previously workless families to move into
work and adults in previously two-worker families to move out of work (Brewer and
Browne, 2006). Again, distinguishing between pure price e¤ects and composition e¤ects
in our analysis will allow us to assess any such e¤ect of these policies. Also, a robustness
check in which we control for selection into employment will be performed.
3One exception may be the introduction of the WFTC in the UK. If it has actually incited rms to
lower wages for low-earners who receive this top-up, our estimates of the NMW e¤ect on the gender wage
gap can be interpreted as a lower bound in the UK, as the e¤ect of the WFTC on wages may have worked
in the opposite direction.
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3.3 Distribution Regression
We suggest an original application of Foresi and Peracchi (1995) and Chernozhukov et al.
(2013), who recently formalized procedures for inferring how policy interventions a¤ect the
entire marginal distribution of an outcome of interest. We extend the typical application
of distribution regression methods to a before-aftersetup where we examine the change
in the di¤erence in wage distributions between men and women, so we are able to pinpoint
the gender wage gap before and after the introduction of the NMW at every point in the
wage distribution.
In a nutshell, this technique involves running a series of binary choice regression models
in order to estimate the entire cumulative distribution function of wages. In each model,
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if an individual i in the sample has an hourly
wage below w, and 0 otherwise, and this is repeated for a series of distinct w values to
estimate F (w) = Pr[wi  w] on a ne grid covering possible wage levels w 2 [wmin; wmax].
After estimating (probit) models separately for men and women and for each time period
(before and after introduction of the NMW), and controlling for a number of workers
characteristics, we predict the probability that an individual has a wage below any value
w in the distribution or what this probability would be if the individual belonged to a
di¤erent gender group or time period. The marginal wage distributions of men and women
before and after the introduction of the NMW can therefore be decomposed to identify
the extent of the wage gaps in each time period and how they changed in the after period,
all else held constant.
More formally, we are interested in the change in the distribution of wages for men and
women observed before and after the introduction of the NMW, given explanatory vari-
ables such as job and human capital characteristics, holding the marginal distribution of
these covariates constant. Marginal wage distributions are directly derived by integration
of the conditional distributions over these variables:
F s;ts0;t0(w) =
Z

h
Z

j
F s;t(wjx; c)hs0;t0(x; c) d dx (1)
where F s;t(jx; c) is the conditional wage distribution function given human capital char-
acteristics x and job characteristics c in gender group s at period t, and hs0;t0 is the density
distribution of human capital and job characteristics in gender group s0 at period t0. The
separation of conditional wage distributions and the distribution of characteristics o¤ers
a straightforward way to create counterfactual marginal wage distributions: F s;ts0;t0(w) can
either be an observed or a counterfactual marginal wage distribution where the super-
script refers to the conditional wage distribution and the subscript refers to the covariate
distribution. The conditional wage distribution can be that of women (s = f) or men
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(s = m) before (t = b) or after (t = a) the introduction of the NMW and the covari-
ate distribution can also relate to women or men before or after the introduction of the
NMW. For example, F f;bf;b (w) is the marginal wage distribution of female workers before
the reform, which is given by integrating the conditional distributions of female workers
before the reform over the female characteristics before the introduction of the NMW.
In the DR approach, sample estimates of (1) are obtained by (i) replacing F s;t(wjx; c) by
estimates F^ s;t(wjx; c) derived from predictions based on probit model parameters at w
estimated in the sample of gender s at time period t, and (ii) by averaging the predictions
over the sample of Ns0;t0 workers of gender s0 at time t0:4
F^ s;ts0;t0(w) =
1
Ns0;t0
Ns0;t0X
i=1
F^ s;t(wjxi; ci): (2)
For example, the female wage distribution before the introduction of the NMW is given
by
F^ f;bf;b (w) =
1
Nf;b
Nf;bX
i=1
F^ f;b(wjxi; ci) (3)
while
F^m;bf;b (w) =
1
Nf;b
Nf;bX
i=1
F^m;b(wjxi; ci) (4)
is a counterfactual for the distribution that would be observed among female workers
before NMW introduction if the conditional wage distributions among male workers had
prevailed over the female distributions. In the counterfactual distribution, predictions
are based on probit model parameters estimated in the male pre-reform sample but with
predictions averaged over the female pre-reform sample. The gender gap in pay before
NMW introduction is captured by the di¤erence between those two distributions:
D^F
b
(w) = F^ f;bf;b (w)  F^m;bf;b (w) (5)
=
1
Nf;b
Nf;bX
i=1

F^ f;b(wjxi; ci)  F^m;b(wjxi; ci)

:
The gender gap in pay after introduction of the NMW can be written analogously as
D^F
a
(w) = F^ f;af;a (w)  F^m;af;a (w) (6)
=
1
Nf;a
Nf;aX
i=1

F^ f;a(wjxi; ci)  F^m;a(wjxi; ci)

:
4Individual sampling weights are omitted from this expression for notational clarity, but they are used
at all estimation stages.
11
The time change in the gender gap observed before and after NMW implementations is
then given by
^DDF (w) = D^F
b
(w)  D^F a(w): (7)
One issue with this approach is that the NMW (or other policies such as those described
in Section 2.3) may have had side-e¤ects on female employment on top of e¤ects on wages,
and hence may have a¤ected the composition and characteristics of women employed after
the NMW. Hence, we further factorize ^DDF (w) into a pricee¤ect that reects changes
in the relative compensation of men and women, and a compositione¤ect, capturing the
role of changes in the characteristics and employment structure of women. To do so, we
construct additional counterfactual marginal distributions that would be observed if the
pricesafter introduction of the NMW were applied to the sample of women with job and
human capital characteristics before the NMW:
F^m;af;b (w) =
1
Nf;b
Nf;bX
i=1
F^m;a(wjxi; ci) (8)
F^ f;af;b (w) =
1
Nf;b
Nf;bX
i=1
F^ f;a(wjxi; ci):
We then decompose the total change as:
^DDF (w) = ^PDF (w) + ^EDF (w) (9)
=
h
F^ f;bf;b (w)  F^m;bf;b (w)

 

F^ f;af;b (w)  F^m;af;b (w)
i
| {z }
^PDF (w)
+
h
F^ f;af;b (w)  F^m;af;b (w)

 

F^ f;af;a (w)  F^m;af;a (w)
i
| {z }
^EDF (w)
:
The rst term, ^PDF (w), captures the time change in the price e¤ect, i.e. the change in
returns or unexplained factors, conditional on holding all characteristics at the female
before levels. This is our measure of interest to interpret the possible impact of NMWs
on the gender gap through its e¤ect on wages. The second term, ^EDF (w), captures
an employment/composition e¤ect for the female sample, i.e. how the gender gap may
change due to time changes in female characteristics. Purging the total change in gender
wage gaps from this second component should clean it from potential e¤ect of policies on
female work hours or occupations.5
5A related source of concern pertains to potential selection into employment, which we shall address
in a sensitivity analysis in the next section.
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4 Results
4.1 Distribution Regression Results
To start with, we plot the predicted distribution of wages for men and women in each
time period against the actual distribution and nd an excellent t for our model (see
Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix). Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the coe¢ cients
on the explanatory variables at four points in the wage distribution: the NMW and the
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles. For example, the negative coe¢ cient on age at the 25th
percentile of the female before group in Ireland indicates that, as age increases, women
are less likely to be located in the lower quartile of the distribution in the year before the
NMW. Following Arulampalam et al. (2007), we omit occupation and industry dummies
as they may be endogenous if individuals choose them based on earning prospects. We
introduce these variables to the model in a robustness check in Section 4.3.
We show, in Figure 2, three sets of distributions for each country and year. We label the
curves STS 0T 0 as shorthand notation for F s;ts0;t0(w) and show the wage distribution using
the coe¢ cients of women or men (s = f;m) before or after the NMW (t = b; a) and the
characteristics of women or men (s0 = f;m) before or after the NMW (t0 = b; a).
Figure 2 around here
We rst show actual distributions in the left panel (FBFB;FAFA;MBMB andMAMA).
At each period, the CDF for female wages lies above that for male wages, indicating that
men are (unconditionally) paid better than women. Additionally, the CDFs for men and
women before lie above those for men and women after, reecting wage growth. This is
more pronounced at the bottom of the wage distribution for women in Ireland.
In the middle panel, we depict distributions where covariates are set to femalecharac-
teristics (i.e. actual female wage distributions FBFB and FAFA and two counterfactual
distributions MBFB and MAFA). The di¤erence between the solid lines (FBFB and
MBFB) captures the gender pay gap before, while the di¤erence between dashed lines
(FAFA and MAFA) captures the gender pay gap after. Adjusting for characteristics
does not account for the whole di¤erence in unconditional gender di¤erences observed in
the left panel there is an unexplainedwage gap. In order to freeze time changes in
characteristics (and, hence, to control for e¤ect of the NMW on the composition of the
workforce), we plot distributions where covariates are xed to female beforecharacteris-
tics in the right panel (i.e. actual FBFB and three counterfactuals FAFB, MBFB and
MAFB). This seems to make little di¤erence compared to the middle panel, suggesting
that composition e¤ects are small.
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While these graphs provide the basic decomposition blocks, we now represent the simple
and double di¤erences that allow us to visualize the evolution of the gender gap after
introduction of the NWM. We start with equation (7). The left panels of Figure 3 depict
the components of this equation, the gender wage gaps before and after the introduction of
NMWs, and the resulting time di¤erence in gender gaps, ^DDF (w) (a value of 1 indicates
that there is a 1 ppt reduction in the di¤erence between a womans and a mans probability
of being paid below w; i.e. a reduction in the gender wage gap). Focusing on the wage
levels around the NMWs (indicated by vertical red lines), we observe a gender pay gap in
both countries before the reform. It is about twice as large in Ireland in this early period.
Strikingly, however, it is twice as small in Ireland after the introduction of NMWs, and
very close to zero. In contrast, the gender gap around the NMW hardly changes over time
in the UK.
Next, we explore the e¤ects dened in equation (9). The middle panel represents the
(time change in) price e¤ect ^PDF while holding characteristics constant at female after
levels. Again, patterns are very similar to those in the rst panel, indicating that there are
no substantial employment composition e¤ects that may a¤ect our interpretation. This
is conrmed in the right hand panels, where the ^EDF and its components are depicted.
This residual e¤ect, capturing the possible impact of composition e¤ects on the gender
gap measure is close to zero for both countries. That is, the ^DDF and ^PDF point to
the same conclusion: there is around 8 ppt reduction in the di¤erence between a womans
and a mans probability of being paid below the NMW in Ireland, while no such e¤ect is
observed in the UK. A small or zero e¤ect in the UK, with no spillover e¤ects, is conrmed
by other results from Robinson (2002, 2005) and Stewart (2012).
Figure 3 around here
Figure 4 shows the ^DDF , ^PDF and ^EDF with 95% bootstrapped condence intervals.
It conrms that a signicant reduction of the gender gap occurred in Ireland, after the
implementation of the NMW, while no e¤ect can be detected in the UK. In Ireland,
condence intervals point to a reduction in the gender gap of 5   15 ppt around the
NMW level (recall that the gap is dened as the di¤erence between a man and a womans
probability of earning below a certain wage). Additionally, there is a small spillover as the
decline in the gender gap is statistically signicant up to 1.6 in logs, which corresponds
to almost IE$5 (14% above the NMW of IE$4.40). There is also an increase in the
gender gap further up in the wage distribution (i.e. at around 2.4 in logs or IE$11).
There are plausible theoretical reasons why we might observe a spillover of this type.
The introduction of the NMW could reduce the wages of workers further up in the wage
distribtuion as institutions attempt to cope with the increased wage bill, Conversely, the
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introduction of the NMW could increase the wage expectations of people located above
the NMW in the wage distribution as their relative position worsens. If either of these
mechanisms occur in a systematically more important way for men than for women or if
men are better at wage bargaining than women, this might increase the gender wage gap
in the middle of the wage distribution after the introduction of the NMW. The literature
relating to the likely size and direction of these e¤ects is mixed (Stewart, 2012; Aeberhardt,
Givord and Marbot, 2016; Dittrich, Knabe and Leipold, 2011). However, as the spillover
e¤ect observed in Figure 4 becomes smaller and non-signicant or even nonexistent in a
number of sensitivity checks (see Section 4.3) while the large decrease in the gender wage
gap around the NMW remains, we refrain from drawing any conclusions in this regard.
Figure 4 around here
4.2 De-trending the E¤ect
To address the concern that our results may be driven by possible pre-existing trends in
the gender gap, we present here a set of results which de-trendthe change in the gender
wage gap between the pre- and post-NMW period (even though there is no indication of
clear pre-existing trends in Figure 1). We use the change in the gender wage gap over a
two-year period preceding the NMW implementation. Let us take the UK as an example.
The NMW was introduced in 1999. Hence, we subtract the change in the gender wage
gap between 1996 and 1998 from the change in the gender wage gap over 1998-2000,
depicted in Figure 4, to calculate the de-trended change in the gender wage gap due
to the introduction of the NMW. Figure 4 essentially showed a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
(di¤erence between male and female wages in 2000 subtracted from this di¤erence in
1998). By analogy, this de-trended e¤ect can be thought of as a triple di¤erence, with the
change in the gender wage gap between 1996 and 1998 subtracted from the change in the
gender wage gap between 1998 and 2000. Results are shown in Figure 5. We nd that
the decrease in the de-trended gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution
in Ireland is similar to the baseline e¤ect observed in Figure 4 although the condence
intervals are a little larger. In the UK, we again observe a statistically insignicant change
in the gender wage gap across the wage distribution after the introduction of the NMW.
Figure 5 around here
4.3 Additional Results and Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to di¤erences in before/after samples or the
model specication, we conducted a number of robustness checks. The main results are
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summarized here while more detailed explanations and corresponding gures are reported
in Appendix C.
Quantifying the Gender Gap. For completeness and comparison with standard analy-
sis of gender gaps in mean wages, we show, in Appendix B, the implications of our distri-
bution function estimates on percentage di¤erences in wage levels, both at the mean and
di¤erent points of the distribution. Results in Table B.1 show that an apparently stable
gender gap at the mean in Ireland hides a very large decrease at the 10th percentile (the
gender gap before was over four times as high as the gender gap after) and small increases
higher up in the wage distribution.
Alternative Samples. We rst use alternative sample denitions, as described in the
data section (summary statistics in Table A.2). We experiment with excluding the Irish
refreshment sample (Sample 1a). The results, in Figure C.1, show that the magnitude of
the time change in the gender gap is almost unchanged. We then restrict the sample for
both countries to a balanced panel of people working both before and after the introduc-
tion of the NMW (Sample 2). The change in the gender wage gap after the introduction
of the NMW is detailed in Figures C.2 and C.3. For the Irish case, we nd larger reduc-
tions in the gender wage gap in the bottom half of the distribution while no increase is
registered further up in the distribution. The small positive spillover e¤ect just above the
NMW persists while the negative e¤ect further up in the distribution is smaller and not
statistically signicant. The zero price e¤ect observed in the UK is robust to this check.
Adding Occupation and Industry. In our baseline model, we follow standard prac-
tice in omitting occupation and industry dummies, which may be endogenous to earning
prospects. In a further check, we incorporate these variables into the model. The Irish
results, shown in Figure C.4, indicate that controlling for industry and occupation type
leads to a similar correction of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution. The
increase in the gender wage gap we previously observed further up in the wage distribu-
tion becomes smaller and is not statistically signicant in this case. For the UK (Figure
C.5), previous conclusions are unchanged.
Changing the Reference Group The baseline results measure the gender wage gap
as the di¤erence between the distribution of female and male wages. This wage gap is
decomposed into a price e¤ect (the di¤erence between the distribution of female wages and
female wages if they were paid according to the male wage structure) and a composition
e¤ect (the di¤erence between the distribution of female wages if they were paid according
to the male wage structure and male wages), giving us the change in the gender wage
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gap. We also compute results based on an alternative decomposition, using men as the
reference groups. Details of this alternative decomposition are provided in Section C.3 in
the Appendix and are in line with results from the rest of the paper. A closing of the
gender wage gap by 5-10 ppt in Ireland is observed and this e¤ect is purely a price e¤ect
and is concentrated around the minimum wage level. No change in the gender wage gap
is observed in the UK.
Selection into Employment. We nally add a control for selection into employment to
our DR model. We adapt the DR method by running a sequence of Heckman-type binary
selection models, rather than a sequence of probit models. The exclusion restrictions used
are the standard ones in this literature: non-labour income and the presence and number
of children. In Ireland, we nd that correcting for endogenous selection gives a similar
gender wage gap correction around the NMW (Figure C.8). The results for the UK still
show no sign of any change in the gender wage gap a¤ect across the distribution after the
introduction of a NMW (Figure C.9).
4.4 Country Comparisons
We found no signicant change in the gender wage gap after the introduction of the
British NMW. Yet, with the same method and with the introduction of a NMW at about
the same time, we nd an almost closing of the gap in neighbouring Ireland. To explain
this di¤erence, we zoom on the wage CDFs at the lowest wage levels in Figure 6. We
observe that there was a sizable shift in the Irish wage distribution around the NMW.
Both male and female wage distributions shift downwards. In contrast, while the year
after the introduction of the British NMW saw very few men earning less than the NMW,
there was still a disproportionate number of women earning below the legal limit. So
while FAFA has shifted downwards around the NMW level in the UK, it has not done
so to the extent that it has in Ireland, nor indeed to the extent that we might expect,
given the new wage legislation.
Compliance with or enforcement of the NMW for womens wages (or female dominated
professions) may have been less e¤ective than for mens wages in the UK. This would
explain why the gender wage gap decreased after the introduction of the NMW in Ireland
but not in the UK.6 This suggested result seems to nd support in o¢ cial reports for both
countries. First, we note that the overall degree of non-compliance does not di¤er much
between countries. The O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK estimated that
6Note that this is not an unprecedented result: previous work by Ferreira et al (2017) using Brazilian
data showed that, during a period of time when the NMW was increasing in Brazil, income inequality
did not decrease as expected because of decreasing compliance with the NMW.
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around 1% of employees were earning less than the NMW in the year after its introduction.
This gure is below our estimate7 and the ONS also acknowledges that its estimation is
likely to be a lower bound due to the method of data collection. Recent estimates point to
larger gures, up to 4%, depending on the data-source used (Low Pay Commission, 2017).8
As for Ireland, o¢ cial measure of non-compliance oscillate between no obvious problem
at the time of introduction (ONeill et al, 2006) to a small degree of non-compliance
(around 5%) according to more recent estimates (Low Pay Commission, 2016), which is
similar to what we observe for the year 2000 from Figure 6. Most importantly for the
interpretation of our results is that a gender di¤erence in compliance seems to be found
only in the UK. For the UK, the pattern of low pay between our data and the ONS data
is consistent: more than twice as many women as men were earning less than the NMW
after its introduction. Contrary to this picture, the right hand panel of Figure 6 shows no
large discrepancy between the proportion of men and the proportion of women paid less
than the NMW in Ireland. This is in line with Irish o¢ cial reports, which do not point
to gender di¤erences in compliance with NMW regulation. To conclude, it seems that
our results are not driven by di¤erences in overall levels of compliance with the NMW
between countries, rather to gender di¤erences in compliance in the UK.9
Figure 6 around here
Finally, we check how the gender wage gap in the UK would have changed if the British
wage distribution had shifted in a similar manner to the Irish wage distribution after the
introduction of the NMW, i.e. if UK compliance had been similar to Irish compliance. We
perform an extrapolation exercise similar to Chernozhukov et al. (2013) in constructing
the new counterfactual distributions of wages after the hypothetical implementation of
a more e¤ective NMW in the UK in 1999. In short, we take the proportion by which
the conditional distribution of wages in Ireland is reduced at the Irish NMW after its
introduction, and then reduce the conditional distribution of British wages before the
7Recall that we nd 5% of employees earning less than the NMW after its introduction, based on
BHPS data. Robinson (2002) found a similarly high proportion of sub-NMW workers using Labour Force
Survey data so we conclude that this is not due to specic problems with the dataset that we use.
8Discrepancies between early ONS estimates and our data are also likely to be due to the fact that the
ONS gures do not include overtime work while our deinition of hourly wages does. Recent work which
investigates the e¤ect of the introduction of a NMW in Germany in 2015 nds that one of the short-term
e¤ects is an increase in upaid overtime hours, so this seems important to account for (Caliendo et al,
2017).
9Figure A.4 in Appendix A gives an overview of which occupations sub-NMW workers are most
represented in before and after the introduction of the NMW in each country. Not surprisingly, the
largest share of sub-NMW workers are to be found in sales, elementary and service occupations. There
is no immediately obvious pattern of di¤erences between the UK and Ireland in this respect.
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introduction of the NMW by that same factor, up to the British NMW level. We do
this separately for men and women and construct the same summary measures for the
estimation of the change in the gender wage gap as before. Denote muk and mie the
British and Irish NMWs. We disregard the sub- and superscripts elaborated in equation
(1) in order to generalize, except for t = b; a which indicates which sample (before or
after) is in question. The new counterfactual marginal wage distributions are constructed
as follows for men and women separately:
F uka (w) = F
uk
a (w) if w  muk (10)
F uka (w) = F
uk
b (w)
P iea (w < m
ie)
F ieb (m
ie)
if w  muk: (11)
Figure 7 shows that hypothetically increasing compliance with the British NMW to the
level of compliance with the Irish NMW results in a narrowing of the gender wage gap
of up to 5 ppt, around the level of the NMW. At the mean, this increased e¤ectiveness
would decrease the unexplained gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW from
the 16% observed in Table B.1 to 15%. This suggests that the negligible change in the
British gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW may be partly attributable
to the disproportionate number of women still earning less than the legal threshold after
its introduction in the UK.
Figure 7 around here
5 Conclusion
National minimumwages can be controversial tools for redistribution due to their potential
negative e¤ects on employment and wages further up in the distribution. To contribute
to the debate surrounding the NMW, we look at an indirect e¤ect of its introduction on
another key labour market indicator, the gender gap in pay. Using recently developed
distribution regression methods, we nd evidence that the gender wage gap at the bottom
of the wage distribution may be e¤ectively reduced by a NMW. This is the case for Ireland
where the gap was eliminated at very low levels of wage after the introduction of the NMW.
On the whole, this had a limited e¤ect on the average wage gap, however. On the contrary,
we do not observe such an e¤ect in the United Kingdom following the introduction of the
NMW.
Despite cultural proximity, similarities in labour market regulations and similar degrees of
sticky oorsbefore 1999, Ireland and the UK also present interesting di¤erences that can
explain the contrasted results. Our analysis suggests this has much to do with relatively
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limited (and gender-biased) compliance. We derive from counterfactual simulations that
more compliance could close the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution
in the UK too.
We also show the importance of distributional analyses of this type. In particular for
Ireland, while the gender wage gap almost closes at the bottom of the distribution after
the introduction of the NMW, there is little change in the mean gap. Replicating this
type of distributional analysis for di¤erent countries and periods around major labour
market shocks therefore seems crucial to better understand how policies versus market
wage setting a¤ect inequality in general and gender inequality in particular. Distribution
regression methods of the type presented in this paper are t for purpose in this respect:
they are exible and provide accurate predictions around the minimum wage, require very
few (parametric) modeling assumptions and are easy to implement.
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Figure 1: The Evolution of the Raw Gender Wage Gap in the UK and Ireland
Table 1: The biteof the MW in the UK and Ireland
Ireland 2000 UK 1999
National Minimum Wage (NMW) 3.40 3.60
Median wage in (t-1) 5.95 6.99
Mean wage in (t-1) 7.05 8.55
Bite of the NMW
        NMW / median wage (t-1) 0.57 0.52
        NMW / mean wage (t-1) 0.48 0.42
Figures, all expressed in Sterling pounds for the current year, are from own
calculations using the population of 22-65 year olds from the Living in Ireland
Survey and British Household Panel Survey.
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Table 2: Employment rate and proportion of workers earning less than the MW
t-1 t+1 t-1 t+1
Employment rate
All 66% 70% 76% 76%
Male 81% 83% 84% 85%
Female 52% 57% 69% 68%
Workers below NMW
All 11.8% 6.0% 8.0% 4.8%
Male 7.0% 4.4% 3.4% 1.6%
Female 17.6% 7.9% 12.2% 7.9%
Full-time 9.8% 5.0% 5.2% 3.5%
Part-time 24.9% 14.4% 24.5% 13.2%
Ireland UK
Figures from own calculations using the population of 22-65 year olds from the Living
in Ireland Survey and British Household Panel Survey. Time period t is 1999 in the UK
and 2000 in Ireland
Table 3: Rate of entry to and exit from the labour market for di¤erent wage levels
Ireland 1999 2001 1999 2001 1999 2001 1999 2001
        wage < NMW 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.24
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
        NMW < wage < 1.25 x NMW 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.15
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
        1.25 x NMW < wage < 1.5 x NMW 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
        wage > 1.5 x NMW 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
UK 1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 2000 1998 2000
        wage < NMW 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.10
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
        NMW < wage < 1.25 x NMW 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
        1.25 x NMW < wage < 1.5 x NMW 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
        wage > 1.5 x NMW 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exit rates document the proportion of people working in time t-1 who are no longer working in time t (1999 or 2001 in Ireland, 1998 or
2000 in UK). Entry rates document the proportion of people working in time t who were not working in time t-1. The wage position
relative to the minimum wage is according to wage at time t-1 for exit rates and time t for entry rates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Figures from own calculations using the population of 22-65 year olds from the Living in Ireland Survey and British Household Panel
Survey.
Men Women
Exit rates Exit ratesEntry rates Entry rates
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Figure 2: Predicted and Counterfactual Wage CDFs Before and After the NMW in
Ireland and the UK.
27
Figure 3: Gender Wage Gap and Change over Time in Ireland and the UK
28
Figure 4: Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time in Ireland and the UK
29
Figure 5: Change in the Gender Wage Gap in Ireland and the UK (De-trended E¤ects)
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A Appendix A: Statistics and Estimates
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Sample 1 for Ireland and the UK
Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff.
Hourly wage 10.38 11.46 1.09*** 8.31 9.29 0.98*** 9.87 10.28 0.41* 7.17 7.78 0.61***
Hours 40.97 40.80 -0.17 31.42 30.96 -0.45 42.37 42.32 -0.05 30.11 30.48 0.37
Age 39.65 40.38 0.73 37.79 39.23 1.44*** 39.83 40.62 0.79** 40.42 41.16 0.74**
University 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.18 0.17 -0.00 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.01
No education 0.46 0.42 -0.03* 0.30 0.31 0.01 0.48 0.47 -0.00 0.59 0.57 -0.02
Married 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.59 0.58 -0.02 0.65 0.64 -0.01 0.64 0.64 -0.00
Temporary job ‡ 0.10 0.07 -0.03** 0.17 0.14 -0.03** 0.04 0.03 -0.02** 0.07 0.05 -0.02**
Part-time job ‡ 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.25 0.24 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.25 0.24 -0.01
Manual ‡ 0.55 0.52 -0.03 0.38 0.37 -0.01 0.45 0.46 0.01 0.29 0.27 -0.02
Public sector ‡ 0.31 0.30 -0.00 0.36 0.37 0.01 0.20 0.19 -0.01 0.38 0.40 0.02
Tertiary sector ‡ 0.57 0.57 -0.00 0.82 0.84 0.02 0.58 0.59 0.01 0.85 0.86 0.01
# observations 1112 1323 914 1214 1904 1860 2023 1945
Selection from the Living in Ireland Survey and the British Household Survey: workers between 22 and 65 and not in education. The
before period is 1999 in Ireland and 1998 in the UK while the after period is 2001 in Ireland and 2000 in the UK. Significance levels are
represented by * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. ‡ as a proportion of those working.
Ireland
Men Women
UK
Men Women
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Alternative Selections
Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff. Before After Diff.
Hourly wage 10.38 12.00 1.63*** 8.31 9.35 1.03*** 10.74 12.01 1.27*** 8.42 10.01 1.59*** 9.84 10.77 0.93*** 7.34 8.09 0.75***
Hours 40.97 40.59 -0.38 31.42 30.30 -1.11** 41.35 41.15 -0.21 33.39 33.03 -0.36 42.48 42.16 -0.32 32.86 33.14 0.28
Age 39.65 42.10 2.46*** 37.79 40.47 2.68*** 39.93 42.00 2.06*** 37.54 39.57 2.03*** 39.59 41.59 2.00*** 40.08 42.08 2.00***
University 0.16 0.15 -0.01 0.18 0.16 -0.01 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00
No education 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.30 0.36 0.05** 0.46 0.44 -0.01 0.27 0.29 0.01 0.47 0.46 -0.01 0.57 0.56 -0.01
Married 0.64 0.71 0.07*** 0.59 0.62 0.03 0.69 0.72 0.03 0.58 0.60 0.02 0.66 0.69 0.03* 0.62 0.65 0.03*
Temporary job ‡ 0.10 0.06 -0.04*** 0.17 0.12 -0.05*** 0.08 0.05 -0.03** 0.16 0.11 -0.05** 0.03 0.02 -0.01** 0.05 0.03 -0.02**
Part-time job ‡ 0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.25 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.14 0.13 -0.01
Manual ‡ 0.55 0.54 -0.01 0.38 0.38 0.01 0.55 0.52 -0.03 0.34 0.31 -0.03 0.45 0.44 -0.00 0.24 0.23 -0.01
Public sector ‡ 0.31 0.32 0.01 0.36 0.37 0.01 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.37 0.39 0.02 0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.41 0.42 0.00
Tertiary sector ‡ 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.82 0.84 0.01 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.82 0.83 0.01 0.58 0.59 0.01 0.84 0.85 0.00
# observations 1112 716 914 649 639 639 497 497 1517 1517 1423 1423
Selection from the Living in Ireland Survey and the British Household Survey: workers between 22 and 65 and not in education. The national minimum wage was introduced in 1999 in the
UK and 2000 in Ireland. The refreshment sample was added to the Irish data in 2000. Sample 2 is a balanced panel of those who work at least 15 hours per week in both periods.
Significance levels are represented by * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. ‡ as a proportion of those working
Men WomenMen Women
Ireland: Sample 2 (Balanced Panel)Ireland: Sample 1a (without Refreshment) UK: Sample 2 (Balanced Panel)
Men Women
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Table A.3: Coe¢ cients of Distribution Regression of Hourly Wage Rates
Age -0.22 *** -0.24 *** -0.27 *** -0.27 *** -0.03 -0.11 ** -0.17 *** -0.15 **
Age2 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 **
Low education 0.58 *** 0.73 *** 1.18 *** 1.44 *** 0.37 * 0.64 *** 0.95 *** 1.39 ***
High education -0.56 * -0.84 *** -1.14 *** -1.82 *** -0.30 -0.71 *** -1.18 *** -1.32 ***
Married 0.20 0.10 0.04 -0.23 -0.17 0.16 -0.12 -0.22
Temporary 0.76 *** 0.39 ** 0.18 0.68 *** 0.38 * 0.48 *** 0.30 0.24
Part-time 0.29 0.66 *** 0.52 *** 0.34 0.39 ** 0.67 *** 0.48 *** 0.15
Constant 2.37 ** 4.17 *** 5.96 *** 7.24 *** -1.06 1.03 3.72 *** 4.39 ***
# observations
Age -0.10 * -0.01 -0.14 *** -0.13 ** 0.04 0.08 -0.09 ** -0.15 ***
Age2 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 * -0.00 -0.00 0.00 * 0.00 ***
Low education 0.26 0.33 ** 0.71 *** 0.82 *** 0.18 0.51 *** 0.68 *** 0.93 ***
High education -0.18 -0.73 *** -1.08 *** -1.25 *** -0.92 *** -0.64 ** -0.76 *** -1.05 ***
Married -0.44 ** -0.65 *** -0.47 *** -0.44 ** -0.99 *** -0.72 *** -0.35 ** -0.41 **
Temporary 0.36 0.23 0.43 0.57 * 0.67 ** 0.68 *** 0.61 *** 0.29
Part-time 0.01 0.76 ** 0.49 0.78 *** 0.33 0.53 * 0.11 -0.20
Constant 0.57 -0.24 3.03 *** 3.89 *** -2.43 ** -2.38 *** 1.75 ** 4.00 ***
# observations
Age -0.02 -0.05 ** -0.15 *** -0.19 *** -0.05 -0.05 * -0.09 *** -0.19 ***
Age2 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
High education -0.40 ** -0.84 *** -1.01 *** -1.07 *** -1.29 *** -1.03 *** -1.11 *** -1.11 ***
Low education 0.43 *** 0.37 *** 0.34 *** 0.39 *** 0.24 ** 0.44 *** 0.37 *** 0.34 ***
Married -0.18 ** -0.14 ** -0.14 ** -0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.05 0.06
Wales 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.36 ** 0.28 ** 0.08 0.18
Scotland -0.02 -0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.21
N. Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
London -0.65 *** -0.67 *** -0.76 *** -0.45 *** -0.44 ** -0.61 *** -0.71 *** -0.66 ***
Temporary 0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.08 0.23 0.28 * 0.20 0.16
Part-time 0.60 *** 0.68 *** 0.45 *** 0.24 ** 0.35 *** 0.71 *** 0.52 *** 0.36 ***
Constant -1.09 * 0.51 3.29 *** 5.04 *** -0.70 0.18 1.91 *** 4.84 ***
# observations
Age -0.14 *** -0.16 *** -0.19 *** -0.21 *** -0.10 * -0.15 *** -0.21 *** -0.28 ***
Age2 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
High education -0.46 * -0.46 *** -0.71 *** -0.99 *** 0.23 -0.20 -0.63 *** -0.95 ***
Low education 0.37 ** 0.35 *** 0.44 *** 0.34 *** 0.64 *** 0.46 *** 0.48 *** 0.40 ***
Married -0.17 -0.23 *** -0.21 *** -0.27 *** -0.55 *** -0.34 *** -0.39 *** -0.30 ***
Wales 0.15 0.28 * 0.15 0.34 ** 0.50 * 0.27 0.23 0.18
Scotland 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.26 * 0.38 0.26 * 0.16 0.28 **
N. Ireland 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00
London -0.22 -0.33 ** -0.55 *** -0.43 *** 0.09 -0.28 * -0.52 *** -0.40 ***
Temporary 0.94 *** 0.91 *** 0.61 *** 0.29 0.37 0.70 *** 0.52 *** 0.30
Part-time 0.98 *** 0.91 *** 0.64 *** -0.02 0.83 ** 0.60 ** 0.30 0.10
Constant 0.69 2.29 *** 3.89 *** 5.26 *** -0.56 1.82 *** 3.92 *** 6.45 ***
# observations
Coefficients from a distribution regressions of hourly wage rates at the four points of the distribution (NMW level, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles), using
Sample 1 (workers in LII and BHPS data aged 22-65 and not in education). Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *
2023 1945
1904 1860
Male sample after introduction of the NMW (MAMA)
Ireland
UK
914 1214
1112 1323
Female sample before introduction of the NMW (FBFB)
Female sample before introduction of the NMW (FBFB)
Female sample after introduction of the NMW (FAFA)
Male sample after introduction of the NMW (MAMA)
Female sample after introduction of the NMW (FAFA)
Male sample before introduction of the NMW (MBMB)
NMW p25 p50 p75 NMW p25 p50 p75
NMW p25 p50 p75 NMW p25 p50 p75
Male sample before introduction of the NMW (MBMB)
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Table A.4: Proportion of workers by occupation earning less then the NMW before and
after its introduction
FB FA MB MA FB FA MB MA
Managers & administrators 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Professional occupations 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Associate professional and technical occupations 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.10)
Clerical & secretarial occupations 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Personal & protective service occupationa 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Plant & machinery operatives 0.22 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
Crafts and related occupations 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00)
Sales occupations 0.28 0.21 0.09 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Skilled agricultural/fishery workers 0.36 0.00 0.20 0.33
(0.48) - (0.10) (0.48)
Skilled craft/trades workers 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.04
(0.08) (0.00) (0.02) (0.09)
Elementary occupations 0.59 0.25 0.21 0.17
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.27)
Other 0.36 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.38 0.17 0.00 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.00) (0.19)
UK Ireland
Proportion of each occupation paid at the NMW or unde for women (F) and men (M) before (B) and after (A) the
introduction of the NMW. Standard errors are in parentheses. Occupations are classified using ISCO for Ireland and SOC
(1990) for the UK. Figures from own calculations using the population of 22-65 year olds from the Living in Ireland Survey
and British Household Panel Survey.
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Figure A.1: Actual vs predicted CDFs of hourly wages (Ireland)
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Lo g W age
Ac tual FB Pre dic ted FB
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
1 1.5 2 2 .5 3
L og W age
Ac tual FA Predic ted FA
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Lo g W age
Ac tual MB P redic ted MB
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
D
F
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Log W age
A ctual M A P redic ted  MA
Figure A.2: Actual vs predicted CDFs of hourly wages (UK)
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B Appendix B: Mean and Percentile E¤ects
It is possible to assess how DR results compare with a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position at the mean. Using the DR framework, we can summarize the e¤ects identied
at specic levels of w on mean wages, as is more traditionally looked at. Mean wages and
counterfactual mean wages are recovered easily from marginal distributions and every-
thing follows from there, for example:
f;bf;b = (F
f;b
f;b ) =
Z 1
0
wdF f;bf;b (12)
This can be estimated from the marginal distribution estimates by numerical integration
^f;bf;b =
KX
g=1
1
2
(!g + !g 1)(F^ f;bf;b (!
g)  F^ f;bf;b (!g 1)) (13)
where f!1; : : : ; !Kg is a grid of points on the domain of denition of wages at which
we evaluate the marginal distributions10, and !0 = 0 (where F^ f;bf;b (!
0) = 0). Results, in
Table B.1, show that the overall gender wage gaps at the mean, as well as the explained
and unexplained components are roughly the same whether we use DR or the standard
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the mean. The mean unexplained gender wage gap
remains stable in Ireland (15   16%) and slightly decreases (from 19 to 16%) in the UK
over the period.
We can also invert the estimated distribution function to obtain counterfactual quantiles.
Consider Qs;ts;t; the th quantile of the counterfactual distribution F
s;t
s;t . The estimated
counterfactual quantile is:
Qs;ts;t; = f bF s;ts;t ()g 1 (14)
We can therefore look at the gender wage gaps at a number of other points in the dis-
tribution (p10; p25; p50; p75 and p90) for comparison with the mean. Results in Table
B.1 show that the small decrease in average unexplained gap in the UK is largely due
to a decrease in the glass ceiling at p90 of the wage distribution. In Ireland, the appar-
ently stable gender gap at the mean hides a very large decrease at p10 (our main result)
and a smaller increase higher up (and in particular at p75). These results highlight the
importance of analyzing the entire distribution of wages in a study such as this.
10To ease computation, we start the grid at approximately 2:5 in national currency in each country
and stop it at 25. This encompasses over 95% of the wage distribution in each country.
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Table B.1: Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap at the Mean and at Percentiles
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
national
currency
% of
male
wage
Wage gap 2.07 21% 2.07 21% 1.40 28% 1.30 20% 1.90 22% 2.50 20% 3.60 21%
Explained 0.61 6% 0.70 7% 0.20 4% 0.50 8% 0.60 7% 1.10 9% 1.60 9%
Unexplained 1.46 15% 1.37 14% 1.20 24% 0.80 12% 1.30 15% 1.40 11% 2.00 11%
Wage gap 1.43 13% 1.39 13% 0.80 14% 1.20 17% 1.80 19% 2.20 17% 1.60 9%
Explained 0.27 3% -0.32 -3% 0.50 9% 0.10 1% -0.20 -2% -0.60 -5% -0.80 -4%
Unexplained 1.70 16% 1.71 16% 0.30 5% 1.10 15% 2.00 21% 2.80 21% 2.40 13%
Wage gap 2.37 25% 2.36 25% 1.20 25% 1.60 27% 2.20 26% 3.40 28% 4.10 25%
Explained 0.58 6% 0.58 6% 0.70 15% 0.70 12% 0.90 11% 0.70 6% 0.40 2%
Unexplained 1.79 19% 1.78 19% 0.50 10% 0.90 15% 1.30 15% 2.70 23% 3.70 22%
Wage gap 2.29 23% 2.26 23% 1.20 24% 1.70 26% 2.10 24% 3.10 25% 3.60 21%
Explained 0.67 7% 0.71 7% 0.80 16% 0.70 11% 0.50 6% 0.50 4% 1.30 8%
Unexplained 1.63 16% 1.55 16% 0.40 8% 1.00 15% 1.60 18% 2.60 21% 2.30 14%
UK
Before
UK
After
Selection from the Living in Ireland survey and the British Household Panel Survey: those aged 22-65 and not in education. Hourly wage gaps expressed in national currency
and as a proportion of male wages.
Standard Mean
Decomposition Mean
Decomposition
Distribution Regressions
Ireland
Before
Ireland
After
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
C Appendix C: Robustness Checks
C.1 Alternative Sample Denitions
This section presents the robustness analyses discussed in the main text. We rst use
alternative sample denitions (summary statistics in Table A.2). To deal with the issue
of the refreshment sample detailed in section 3.1, we restrict the Irish data to those who
are not part of this boost sample (Sample 1a). Results are presented in Figure C.1.
Sample 2 restricts the analysis to those observed both before and after the introduction
of the NMW and who work at least 15 hours per week in both periods. The change in
the gender wage gap after the introduction of the NMW is detailed in Figures C.2 and
C.3 for Ireland and the UK respectively.
C.2 Adding Occupation and Industry Dummies
Our baseline model follows standard practice in omitting occupation and industry dum-
mies, as they may be endogenous if individuals choose them based on earning prospects.
Here, we present results which incorporate these variables into the model as a robust-
ness check. We introduce a dummy variable for working in a manual job, for working
in the public sector and for working in the tertiary (services) industry compared to the
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Figure C.1: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 1a, Ireland)
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Figure C.2: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 2, Ireland)
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Figure C.3: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Sample 2, UK)
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
p
t
1 1 .5 2 2.5 3
Log W a ge
C h ange in  gende r g ap (D D F )
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
P
pt
1 1 .5 2 2 .5 3
Lo g W ag e
Pr ice e ffec t (PD F )
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
P
pt
1 1 .5 2 2.5 3
L og W ag e
Em ploy m ent e ffec t (E D F )
T he c ha nge in  th e gende r  gap show s  the b efore -  a f ter d if fere nc e in  the  ge nder  g aps w ith  95 % boots trapp ed co nfidenc e in te rv a ls . T he  red l ine ind ic at es th e
leve l o f the m in im um  w age in  n ational  cu r ren cy .
Figure C.4: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Including Occupations and Industries,
Ireland)
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Figure C.5: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Including Occupations and Industries, UK)
primary/secondary industries (see Table A.1 for summary statistics relating to these vari-
ables).11 The results from this broader model of wages are presented in Figures C.4 and
C.5. The Irish results indicate that controlling for industry and occupation type leads
to a similar correction of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution, which
peaks at 13 ppt. The increase in the gender wage gap observed further up in the wage
distribution in Figure 4 becomes smaller and is not statistically signicant. The UK re-
sults are similarly ambiguous across the wage distribution, regardless of whether industry
or occupational characteristics are accounted for.
C.3 Changing the reference group
We outline here an alternative decomposition which uses men as the reference group.
The price e¤ect is the di¤erence between the distribution of male wages if they were
paid according to the structure of female wages and the distribution of male wages. The
composition e¤ect is the di¤erence between the distribution of male wages if they were
paid according to the female wage structure and the distribution of female wages. This
gives us the change in the gender wage gap as follows:
11Model coe¢ cients are available from authors on request.
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Figure C.6: Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time (Ireland) - male as the reference
group
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The results for this decomposition are displayed in Figures C.6 and C.7 below. They
are in line with the baseline and other results in the paper: a closing of the gender
wage gap by 5-10 ppt in Ireland is observed and this e¤ect is purely a price e¤ect and
is concentrated around the minimum wage level. No change in the gender wage gap is
observed in the UK.
C.4 Sample Selection Correction
The possibility of a relationship between the probability of women working and their hav-
ing characteristics associated with higher wages has been long recognised in the literature
on wage inequality and the gender wage gap. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) explore the
non random presentation of women into employment and gender wage gaps but for the
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Figure C.7: Change in the Gender Wage Gap over Time (UK) - male as the reference
group
median of the distribution only. Blundell et al. (2007) allow for the impact of nonran-
dom selection into work by using Manski bounds to the latent wage distribution which
are progressively tightened using restrictions motivated by economic theory, following the
procedure proposed. For direct selection correction in QR, Buchinsky (1998) suggests
an additive approach that has been adapted by Albrecht et al. (2009) and Garcia et al.
(2001) to correct for selection in gender wage gap estimations. However, this method has
recently been called into question by Huber (2014) and Huber and Melly (2011) due to
the assumption required for consistency that the errors are independent of the regressors,
implying that all quantile and mean functions should be parallel.12
DR allows for a simpler, more intuitive selection correction. To account for any selec-
tion bias engendered by the decision to select into work, we suggest a simple correction
technique. We adapt the DR method by running a sequence of Heckman-type binary se-
lection models, rather than a sequence of probit models. The exclusion restrictions used
are the standard ones in this literature: non-labour income and the presence and number
12It is also di¢ cult to specify a data-generating process that is consistent with this approach (see
Albrecht et al., 2009). Note that in the context of gender gap estimations, other approaches have been
used. Mussida and Picchio (2014) follow the approach of Donald et al. (2000), whereby a exible
wage hazard function is estimated to recover the corresponding conditional wage distribution from the
estimated parameters, and introduce selection correction. Van Kerm (2013) suggests distributionally
sensitive summary measures of wage di¤erentials with a copula-based selection model.
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Figure C.8: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Accounting for Selection into Employment,
Ireland)
of children. The coe¢ cients from the wage and selection equations at four points in the
wage distribution, namely at the NMW, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, are shown
in Table C.1. The magnitude and sign of the coe¢ cients in the wage equation are compa-
rable to those observed without selection correction in Tables A.3 and the coe¢ cients on
the exclusion restrictions are of the expected sign with at least one statistically signicant
in each specication. In Ireland, we nd that correcting for selection bias gives a similar
gender wage gap correction around the NMW, of up to 10 ppt (Figure C.8) The results for
the UK are similarly ambiguous across the wage distibution with and without correction
for selection bias (Figure C.9).
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Table C.1: Coe¢ cients of Selection-Corrected Distribution Regressions of Hourly Wages
Age -0.10 0.17 *** -0.11 * 0.17 *** -0.13 ** 0.16 *** -0.19 ** 0.17 *** -0.03 0.08 ** -0.08 0.08 ** -0.13 * 0.08 ** -0.10 0.07 **
Age2 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 ***
Low education 0.31 * -0.63 *** 0.36 ** -0.63 *** 0.58 ** -0.63 *** 1.01 ** -0.63 *** 0.48 -0.57 *** 0.43 -0.57 *** 0.74 *** -0.57 *** 1.20 *** -0.57 ***
High education -0.36 0.55 *** -0.49 ** 0.54 *** -0.80 *** 0.51 *** -1.58 *** 0.55 *** -0.31 0.62 *** -0.57 ** 0.63 *** -1.02 *** 0.63 *** -1.07 *** 0.62 ***
Married 0.10 -0.40 *** -0.02 -0.39 *** -0.13 -0.38 *** -0.34 -0.39 *** -0.11 -0.27 ** 0.09 -0.28 ** -0.18 -0.27 ** -0.30 * -0.27 **
Temporary 0.68 *** 0.36 ** 0.12 0.61 ** 0.41 ** 0.47 *** 0.30 0.19
Part-time 0.10 0.49 *** 0.45 ** 0.40 0.31 0.49 ** 0.34 ** 0.16
Child 0.42 0.32 0.21 0.32 -0.26 -0.30 -0.25 -0.30
Other income 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
No. of children -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.08 ** -0.07 ** 0.00 -0.08 ** -0.08
Constant 0.39 -2.10 *** 1.46 -1.99 *** 3.08 ** -1.77 ** 5.40 *** -1.92 ** -1.04 -0.05 0.40 0.03 2.79 ** 0.02 3.24 ** 0.10
Age -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.17 *** 0.02 -0.17 *** 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.15 *** 0.04
Age2 0.00 -0.00 ** 0.00 -0.00 ** 0.00 *** -0.00 * 0.00 *** -0.00 ** -0.00 -0.00 ** -0.00 -0.00 ** 0.00 -0.00 ** 0.00 *** -0.00 **
Low education 0.14 -0.49 *** 0.36 * -0.52 *** 0.71 *** -0.51 *** 0.90 *** -0.50 *** 0.18 -0.64 *** 0.42 ** -0.63 *** 0.57 *** -0.63 *** 0.97 *** -0.64 ***
High education -0.08 0.67 *** -0.77 *** 0.66 *** -1.10 *** 0.61 ** -1.26 *** 0.62 *** -0.92 *** 0.19 -0.64 ** 0.19 -0.70 *** 0.16 -1.01 *** 0.18
Married -0.26 1.03 *** -0.74 *** 1.04 *** -0.71 *** 1.03 *** -0.60 *** 1.04 *** -1.03 *** 1.15 *** -0.60 *** 1.15 *** -0.23 1.17 *** -0.59 ** 1.14 ***
Temporary 0.30 0.23 0.36 0.51 0.69 ** 0.69 *** 0.56 *** 0.23
Part-time -0.06 0.79 ** 0.40 0.89 *** 0.20 0.57 0.12 -0.10
Child -0.17 -0.26 -0.36 -0.33 -0.35 -0.34 -0.32 -0.40
Other income -0.00 *** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 ** -0.00 * -0.00 * -0.00 **
No. of children -0.12 *** -0.10 ** -0.10 *** -0.11 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00
Constant 0.09 -0.12 *** 0.05 -0.10 ** 3.55 *** -0.10 *** 4.66 *** -0.11 *** -2.62 ** -0.01 0.57 -0.01 1.27 -0.02 3.99 *** -0.00
Variable
Age -0.01 0.19 *** -0.05 ** 0.19 *** -0.17 *** 0.19 *** -0.20 *** 0.19 *** -0.03 0.22 *** -0.05 * 0.22 *** -0.11 *** 0.22 *** -0.19 *** 0.22 ***
Age2 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 ** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 -0.00 *** 0.00 * -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 ***
High education -0.38 ** 0.20 ** -0.87 *** 0.20 ** -1.02 *** 0.20 ** -1.10 *** 0.19 ** -1.27 *** 0.20 ** -1.05 *** 0.19 ** -1.14 *** 0.19 ** -1.11 *** 0.19 **
Low education 0.42 *** -0.12 * 0.35 *** -0.12 * 0.38 *** -0.12 * 0.38 *** -0.13 * 0.22 ** -0.13 ** 0.41 *** -0.13 ** 0.37 *** -0.13 ** 0.33 *** -0.14 **
Married -0.18 ** -0.11 * -0.13 ** -0.11 * -0.09 -0.11 * 0.01 -0.12 ** 0.01 -0.12 * 0.03 -0.12 ** -0.04 -0.12 ** 0.07 -0.12 **
Temporary 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.22 0.25 * 0.15 0.13
Part-time 0.57 *** 0.64 *** 0.43 *** 0.27 *** 0.33 *** 0.72 *** 0.54 *** 0.40 ***
Child 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
Other income -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 ***
No. of children -0.31 *** -0.31 *** -0.30 *** -0.30 *** -0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.24 *** -0.24 ***
Constant -1.39 ** -1.95 *** 0.58 -1.95 *** 3.92 *** -1.94 *** 5.39 *** -1.94 *** -0.99 -2.63 *** 0.32 -2.63 *** 2.34 *** -2.63 *** 5.02 *** -2.64 ***
Age -0.12 *** 0.13 *** -0.16 *** 0.13 *** -0.19 *** 0.13 *** -0.21 *** 0.13 *** -0.11 * 0.13 *** -0.14 *** 0.13 *** -0.21 *** 0.13 *** -0.28 *** 0.13 ***
Age2 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 ** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 *** 0.00 *** -0.00 ***
High education -0.44 * 0.60 *** -0.53 *** 0.60 *** -0.80 *** 0.60 *** -1.00 *** 0.60 *** 0.21 0.51 *** -0.29 ** 0.51 *** -0.70 *** 0.51 *** -0.96 *** 0.51 ***
Low education 0.36 ** -0.03 0.35 *** -0.03 0.44 *** -0.03 0.35 *** -0.03 0.64 *** -0.06 0.44 *** -0.06 0.44 *** -0.06 0.38 *** -0.06
Married -0.14 0.60 *** -0.24 *** 0.60 *** -0.27 *** 0.60 *** -0.28 *** 0.59 *** -0.57 *** 0.50 *** -0.32 *** 0.50 *** -0.40 *** 0.50 *** -0.35 *** 0.50 ***
Temporary 0.94 *** 0.92 *** 0.61 *** 0.30 * 0.38 0.61 *** 0.59 *** 0.27
Part-time 0.94 *** 0.83 *** 0.66 *** 0.06 0.84 ** 0.69 *** 0.27 0.10
Child 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18
Other income -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 *** -0.00 ***
No. of children -0.18 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** -0.17 *** -0.16 ** -0.16 ** -0.16 ** -0.15 **
Constant 0.48 -0.98 * 2.31 *** -0.99 * 3.97 *** -1.01 ** 5.45 *** -1.05 ** -0.37 -0.92 1.85 *** -0.92 4.12 *** -0.92 6.62 *** -0.91
2908
Male sample before introduction of the NMW (MBMB) # obs.: 2351 Male sample after introduction of the NMW (MAMA) # obs.: 2271
Female sample before introduction of the NMW (FBFB) # obs.: 2999 Female sample after introduction of the NMW (FAFA) # obs.:
Female sample before introduction of the NMW (FBFB) Female sample after introduction of the NMW (FAFA)# obs.: # obs.:
Male sample before introduction of the NMW (MBMB) Male sample after introduction of the NMW (MAMA)# obs.: # obs.:1418 1669
21391782
Ireland
UK
p50 p75
p50 p75NMW p25 p50 p75 NMW p25
NMW p25 p50 p75 NMW p25
Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection Selection SelectionWage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection
Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage
Wage Selection Wage Selection WageSelection Wage Selection Wage Selection Selection
Coefficients from a selection-corrected distribution regressions of hourly wage rates at the four points of the distribution (NMW level, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles), using Sample 1 (workers in LII and BHPS data aged
22-65 and not in education). Equations control for regions. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and * respectively.
Selection
Wage Selection Wage Selection Wage
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Figure C.9: Change in the Gender Wage Gap (Accounting for Selection into Employment,
UK)
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